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A CRITIQUE OF A. C. GRAHAM'S RECONSTRUCTION OF THE 
"NEO-MOHIST CANONS" 
JANE M. GEANEY 
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND 
A. C. Graham's Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Sciences (1978) is the only Western-language 
translation of the obscure and textually corrupt chapters of the Mozi that purportedly constitute the 
foundations of ancient Chinese logic. Graham's presentation and interpretation of this difficult ma- 
terial has been largely accepted by scholars. This article questions the soundness of Graham's recon- 
struction of these chapters (the so-called "Neo-Mohist Canons"). Upon close examination, problems 
are revealed in both the structure and the content of the framework Graham uses to interpret the 
Canons. Without a more reliable framework for interpreting the text, it seems best to remain skeptical 
about claims that the Canons represent evidence for the study of logic in early China. 
THE NEO-MOHIST CANONS ARE COMMONLY thought 
to be the closest thing to logic in ancient China. A. C. 
Graham's reconstruction of this almost unintelligible text 
has been hailed as "the single most important study on 
Chinese logic ever published."' Graham suggests that the 
Canons also contain the germs of Chinese science, des- 
tined to be undeveloped due to poor preservation of this 
text. Sinologists have used Graham's reconstruction not 
only to understand Neo-Mohist logic and science, but also 
to elucidate methods of argumentation and technical ter- 
minology throughout ancient China. This article questions 
whether we can in fact rely on Graham's reconstruction. 
According to Graham, an "organizing principle must be 
identified if the items [in the Canons] are to be read in 
context."2 But the organizing principle Graham selects for 
reconstructing the text is questionable. The organizing 
principle determines the order and the themes that pro- 
vide the context for interpretation. If it is called into ques- 
tion, we lack the necessary context for interpreting the 
Canons. Given the countless questions about line-breaks 
and emendations of characters in the Canons, it is by 
no means easy to determine, on a case-by-case basis for 
each Canon, whether it is possible to reject Graham's or- 
ganizing principle for the Canons as a whole but still to 
retain his translation (or even, in many cases, his deci- 
1 In the biographical note on Graham in Epistemological 
Issues in Classical Chinese Philosophy, ed. Hans Lenk and 
Gregor Paul (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993), 185. 
2 A. C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argumen- 
tation in Ancient China (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989), 138. 
sion about what counts as the beginning and ending of a 
"Canon" and an "Explanation"). Although Graham's re- 
construction is a monumental achievement and we may 
have nothing better to use in its place, I fear that we do 
not yet have a reliable source of Neo-Mohist thought. 
In what follows I shall first identify two general prob- 
lems with Graham's proposed restructuring of the Can- 
ons: the fact that there are two apparently similar sections 
that Graham believes refer to distinctly different disci- 
plines, and the fact that there are gaps in his construction 
of the Canons into supposedly parallel halves. Next, I 
shall question Graham's contention (fundamental to his 
restructuring of the Canons) that the Mohist divides the 
world into an eternally necessary realm and a transient, 
non-necessary realm. Graham contends that in the eternal 
realm knowledge is necessary, whereas in the transient 
realm procedures for knowledge are merely consistent, 
and that neither realm spawns epistemological questions. 
This separation of a necessary, atemporal realm from a 
non-necessary, temporal realm does not seem grounded 
in the thought of ancient China. And the intelligibility 
of Graham's reconstruction is not compelling enough to 
justify his theorizing that the Neo-Mohists invented such 
a world-view. If it is the case that the Mohist raises no 
epistemological questions, perhaps it is not because he 
believes knowledge is necessary (as Graham argues), but 
because, as elsewhere in ancient China, there is no dras- 
tic separation between realms such that skeptical ques- 
tions might be raised concerning their reconnection. 
Briefly, Graham's presentation of the history of the neo- 
Mohist Canons is as follows. The Canons were written 
sometime around 300 B.C. Unfortunately, when a com- 
plete text of the book called Mozi was assembled for the 
1 
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DEFINITIONS 
1. A 1-6 reason, unit, knowing 
2. A 7-39 conduct and government 
- A 40-51 spatial and temporal conditions of knowing 
3. A 52-69 geometry 
4. A 70-75 disputation 
(A 76-87 Appendix: 12 Ambiguous words)3 
Han imperial library (in the last century B.c.), the Can- 
ons (which make up pian 40 and 41 of the Mozi) had 
already been separated from their Explanations (which 
make up pian 42 and 43). Moreover, the sections Graham 
calls "Expounding the Canons" (which he abbreviates as 
EC) and "Names and Objects" (which he abbreviates as 
NO) had become fragments, respectively called "Bigger 
Pick" )kl (pian 44) and "Smaller Pick" /J\g (pian 45), 
the lead characters (the first word of each Canon re- 
peated as a heading) had been incorporated into the text. 
What Graham considers to be the text's five divisions (if 
they exist at all) were not marked. To make matters 
worse, before the end of the Sui dynasty (581-618), a text 
of the Mozi consisting of only the first thirteen chapters 
began to circulate. For about a thousand years thereafter 
no one read the complete text, although it survived in the 
Daoist Patrology. Eventually, the complete text was re- 
printed in what is known as the "Lu edition," based on 
the Sung Daoist Patrology (1552), and the "Tang edi- 
tion," based on the Ming Daoist Patrology (1553). The 
first modern commentary on the Mozi was not written till 
the mid-1700s, and it was only in 1894 that Sun Yirang 
n,h wrote his great commentary on the text. 
Even after Sun Yirang's commentary, the Canons re- 
mained notoriously difficult to interpret. Graham proposes 
an outline that is intended to make the Canons intelli- 
gible. This outline splits the Canons in half, then splits 
each side into five parts in order to create a context from 
which to interpret each Canon. (Graham refers to these 
five parts as "sections" one through four, with the third 
section being a bridging sequence; see chart below.) The 
Canons were traditionally divided into "Parts" A and B. 
Graham calls this break "arbitrary" and divides the text 
at Canon A 88. Everything before that he refers to as 
"definitions" (A 1-87) and everything after as "proposi- 
tions" (A 88-B 82). With his new arrangement, Graham 
believes that what he calls the "definitions" and the 
"propositions" can be seen to follow five more or less 
3 A. C. Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Science 
(Hong Kong: Chinese Univ. Press, 1978), 230. 
PROPOSITIONS 
A 88-B 12 consistent description procedures 
B 13-16 spatial and conditions of knowing 
B 17-31 problems in optics, mechanics, and economics 
B 32-82 problems in disputation 
parallel sections with corresponding themes. This results 
in the model, supra, for the Canons. 
This model makes it possible for Graham to circum- 
scribe the topic of each of the Canons within one of the 
five sections. Accordingly, the fivefold order behind the 
Canons (a few pieces of which are actually absent from 
the Canons) is something like this: 
1. Description = relating names to objects (transient). 
2. Ethics = explaining how to act (transient). 
- Bridging sequence, on change. 
3. Sciences = explaining objects (eternally necessary). 
4. Disputation or Logic = explaining names (eternally 
necessary). 
As a result of this order, Graham claims that, with the 
exception of the final section on logic, for every Canon 
there is enough of a context to establish "its general 
theme."4 
However, in many ways these themes that are sup- 
posed to provide the context for interpretation are forced. 
Specifically, Graham himself admits that to us there ap- 
pear to be two sections whose theme is logic (that is, in 
Graham's wording, "the realm of names"). But this, in- 
stead of causing him to question his theme-arrangement, 
prompts him to speculate that the Mohist "must be look- 
ing at logical problems from a different viewpoint which 
it would help us to locate."5 Rather than search for a 
peculiarly Chinese approach to logic, we might instead 
reexamine Graham's division of the text and the parallel 
themes that lead him to such speculation. 
In an attempt to distinguish between the two sections 
that both resemble "logic," Graham admits that the first 
section he identifies, which he calls "description" (names 
and objects6), "shares most of its terminology with the 
4 Ibid., 229. 
5 Ibid., 231. 
6 This section, "names and objects," is to be distinguished 
from a later pian of the Canons that Graham calls "Names and 
objects." In a later publication Graham no longer uses "descrip- 
tion" for the relation of names and objects, but "discourse" 
instead; see his Disputers of the Tao. 
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fourth discipline, disputation proper ['logic' or 'names 
only']."7 In spite of this common terminology, Graham 
insists that there must be a difference between the two 
sections-that is, that the Mohists believe there is a dif- 
ference between the "realm of names and objects" and 
the "realm of names." (Significantly, this difference in- 
volves the temporal nature of the two realms, as we 
shall see below.) Yet, Graham admits that this difference 
"emerges distinctly only in the two sequences of propo- 
sitions" (i.e., in two of the sections on the side of what 
Graham calls the "propositions" half of the Canons). He 
notes that "the difference ... is clear enough in the prop- 
ositions but remains nearly invisible in the definitions."8 
However, he also maintains that in the propositions, 
where the distinction is supposed to "emerge distinctly," 
"the Mohist seems especially concerned with the fun- 
damental terms which the first discipline shares with 
the rest, first of all the word ku ti 'reason'."9 In other 
words, in the definitions half, Graham is unable to point 
to any difference between description and disputation. 
Moreover, in the propositions half, instead of the differ- 
ence emerging distinctly," the shared terms emerge. Yet 
Graham does not permit this to invalidate his division 
of the two halves-the definitions and the propositions. 
Nor does it make him doubt what he claims to be the 
"parallelism of general themes" that seems to be his main 
justification for splitting the Canons just at that partic- 
ular point, and referring to the two divisions as defini- 
tions and propositions. Instead, he relies solely on the 
following characterization of the first and fourth sections 
of the propositions for evidence that one of them is about 
names and objects (description) and the other is only 
about names (logic): he calls the first section "a close- 
knit sequence laying down procedures for deciding what 
is so of objects" and the last section "a series of miscel- 
laneous propositions shown by logical ['names only' or 
'disputation'] analysis to be admissible, self-refuting, 
consistent, unnecessary, inadmissible unless a condition 
is fulfilled" (emphasis added). Because what is at issue is 
precisely whether or not the first section is about "decid- 
ing what is so of objects" (as opposed to names only), 
this characterization of Graham's actually amounts to a 
claim that the first section is "a close-knit sequence" and 
the fourth is "a series of miscellaneous propositions." 
7 Later Mohist Logic, 262. 
8 Ibid., 232. 
9 Ibid., 262, emphasis added. Graham concludes that "what 
seems to have happened is that the Mohist took advantage of 
Division 1 to dispose of terms fundamental to all four disci- 
plines, such as gu it 'reason' and zhi ̂ [ 'know'" (p. 232). 
There is no doubt that the fourth section is a miscel- 
laneous series. In contrast to it, the first section may 
seem "close-knit." But that is unrelated to the question of 
whether the first section is about "description" (names 
and objects) or the fourth is about "logic" (names). The 
fourth section, which Graham says is about names, con- 
tains items B 52 (which appears to be about supporting 
weights from hairs) and B 62 (which has something to 
do with the relation of a spherical object and being up- 
right). Graham notes that these "are the only problems 
of B 34-82 which connect with the mechanics sections 
(B 25-29)." But B 52 and B 62 are not the only Canons 
whose subject matter seems incongruous with a section 
that is supposed to be concerned with disputation (names). 
B 60, for instance, seems to use a metaphor of hoeing to 
make a point about progress. B 69 appears to be about 
leading and following, using the metaphor of singing and 
borrowing someone's coat. B 65 seems to be about the 
tallying of wood and stone squares. B 56 also seems to 
be out of place in a section on "disputation proper." It 
appears to concern the submerging of a bramble in water. 
It reads: 
B 56 m?, j- t, AtA. 
[Ml1. rt~mi;-g, ?t~i?mgt. 
c. The extension of the bramble is because its submer- 
gence is shallow. Explained by: what we use. 
E. In the case of the thing we use to submerge the bram- 
ble, that its submergence is shallow is not because 
the bramble is shallow.10 
According to Graham's interpretation, "B 56, like B 55, 
deals with a problem of causation."" Presumably this ex- 
plains its presence in the logic (names) section, although 
Graham often notes that causation is characteristic of the 
sciences (objects), rather than logic. Ironically, without 
noting the implications of the placement of B 56 in a 
section on disputation (names), Graham takes it as a test 
case for the importance of context in interpreting the 
Canons. He writes: 
B 56 is almost unique in that it has no apparent relation 
with other sections and does not contain a single impor- 
tant word found elsewhere in the corpus. It is of interest 
as an especially vivid reminder of the extent to which the 
understanding of Classical Chinese depends on context.12 
10 All translations are Graham's unless otherwise noted. 
1 Later Mohist Logic, 427. 
12 Graham adds: "My own interpretation has the advantage 
over most that it involves no emendation to the body of the 
3 
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In addition to these problems with Graham's proposed 
explanation for the order of the Canons, there are gaps in 
the purportedly parallel structure of the definitions and 
the propositions. The "ethics" section of the definitions 
lacks a corresponding section in the propositions. More- 
over, Graham says that nine Canons placed between the 
definitions and the propositions compose an appendix on 
"ambiguous words." These too lack a corresponding sec- 
tion in the propositions. Amidst both the definitions and 
the propositions Graham notes another section, which 
he calls a "bridging sequence." It includes eight Canons 
from the definitions (A 40-52), and three from the prop- 
ositions (B 13-16). The only evidence offered that this 
is a separate section is that the last two of these Canons 
in the definition section discuss the words, "staying" and 
"necessary." Graham thinks these two terms constitute a 
bridge between the "transcience" belonging to the sec- 
tions on names and objects and on ethics and the "eter- 
nity" belonging to the section on names and that on 
objects. 
Of the two bridging sequences on knowledge and change, 
the sequence of definitions ends with zhi IL 'staying' 
(A 50), the temporary validity of names fitting transient 
phenomena in the first two arts, and bi , 'necessary' (A 
51), the unending certainty of judgments in the last two.13 
Graham's characterization of these sections as either 
"transient" or "eternal" creates more problems than it 
solves. In his ordering of the Canons, each of the four 
sections represents a different discipline of study (the 
names section is logic; the objects section, science; the 
names and objects section, description; and another sec- 
tion that involves both names and objects is referred to 
as ethics). Graham's characterization of these sections as 
eternal or transient leads him to argue that the study of 
names is closer to the study of objects because these op- 
erate according to necessity, whereas the study of names 
Canon or Explanation (although I do transfer the illustrative 
gloss at the end to B 57)." 
13 Later Mohist Logic, 30. Here and in other quotations 
Graham's Wade-Giles romanizations have been altered to pinyin. 
Incidentally, the number of Canons in these sections is also not 
"parallel." In the bridging sequence there are more Canons from 
the definitions than from the propositions. In the sections on 
"names" and on "names and objects" the opposite occurs. For 
names and objects, from the definitions there are six Canons 
(A 1-6); from the propositions, there are nineteen (A 88-B 12, 
excluding A 89-92). For names, from the definitions there are 
five Canons (A 70-75); from the propositions there are fifty 
(B 32-82). 
and objects resembles ethics because it aspires only to 
consistency. 14 
Graham notes that there seem to be connections be- 
tween the Mohist's view of names and the Mohist's view 
of objects. He writes: 
... two geometrical terms are applied to propositions in 
Names and objects, to designate what seems to be the 
pause and the phrase-position (NO 9; illustrations of 'a 
priori' demonstration are taken from the geometry of the 
square and the circle (A 90, 93, 98); several times in 
sequences on ethics, change, and disputation one notices 
other verbal or material connexions with sections on 
optics (A 47, 48) and mechanics (A 21, B 52, 62). 
To some extent, Graham seems to attribute the connec- 
tions between the discipline of names and the discipline 
of objects to a social situation in which the same people 
work in both areas. 
The sections on optics and mechanics surely reflect social 
conditions comparatively rare in history until the 16th 
century in Western Europe, where the Scientific Revo- 
lution soon followed, the explosive situation when men 
with speculative minds are in close contact with men who 
work with their hands.15 
Graham also attributes this similar use of terminology 
to interrelations in the subject-matter. However, what he 
cites as the connection in the subject-matter seems to 
amount only to a connection between the eternal rela- 
tions within the names section and the eternal relations 
within the objects section. The similarities in these rela- 
tions do not extend to the discipline of "the relation of 
names to objects" (description). In this view, when sep- 
arated from one another, the relations of names and ob- 
jects are "eternal," and necessary knowledge is possible 
both within the realm of names (logic) and within the 
realm of objects (science). 
Graham suggests that when relating names to objects 
(in description), our capacity for certainty of knowledge 
is reduced to the (minimal) requirement of consistent 
procedures. "As long as we are describing the realm of 
14 On the other hand, Graham asserts that the study of names 
is no closer to the study of names and objects than to any other 
of the disciplines. He writes, "If we have correctly identified 
the underlying principle of classification, the last of the four 
arts [logic] is no closer to the first [description] than to either of 
the others." Later Mohist Logic, 31. 
15 Ibid., 8. 
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changing objects we are obliged only to follow consis- 
tent procedures, extending the name we apply to one 
object to every similar object."16 It is not clear why knowl- 
edge would lose certainty in this way. At times Graham 
presents the matter as if the problem is "names fitting 
transient phenomena."17 At other times, names themselves 
seem to be changing. When the Mohist tries to relate 
names and objects, Graham says, he encounters the diffi- 
culty of making the name stop (zhi iL) or confine itself 
to one thing. 
In any case, Graham argues that, in keeping with 
"eternal" nature, the requirements for the relations in the 
discipline of names are stricter than in the "transient" 
discipline of names and objects (description). He states 
that the difference between the realm of names and the 
realm of names and objects is that "when we confine our- 
selves to the realm of names, these consistencies [con- 
sistent procedures for relating names to objects] reveal 
themselves as complementary relations which are neces- 
sary." To support this, he cites A 78 which he interprets 
as saying that when objects are referred to in quotation, 
their relation to names becomes necessary. "If we put the 
quotation device yeh che -tU after 'like the object' we 
can say that "For 'like the object' one necessarily uses 
this name (A 78 []W]-t_2 , ,,~L_ . Cf. A 31)."18 
As part of the contrast between the necessary (bi J,) 
relations of logic and science and the non-necessary 
16 Ibid., 38, emphasis added. 
17 Ibid., 30. 
18 However, Graham adds, the necessary relations that char- 
acterize the register of names do not develop beyond com- 
plementary relations to more sophisticated logical implication. 
Names simply come in pairs whose elements follow or dismiss 
each other: 
Among pairs of names we sometimes find that X and 
Y "follow from each other" (xiang cong tU]~, EC 3, 
A 93), or "dismiss each other" (xiang qu t$H), or that 
one of them cannot "be dismissed without the other" 
(pian qu Q; B 3, 4, 7), for example 'seeing' and 'ap- 
pearing', 'length' and 'breadth' (B 4). The authors of the 
Canons, who have no conception of the proposition, think 
of all logical implication in terms of names of which at 
least one is the 'complement' (ti ni) of the other, after 
the analogy of 'elder-brother' and 'younger-brother', a 
pair in which "both are complements" (A 88). Wherever 
implication is two-way either member of the pair may 
be inferred from the other as its converse (fan i, 
defined in A 73 as "If inadmissible then on both sides 
inadmissible"), for example that if one class of objects 
is called 'oxen' all other objects are non-oxen. (Ibid.) 
relations of description, Graham contrasts the comple- 
mentarity of "this/not this" (shifei HEr) to the non- 
complementarity of "what is so" (ran ,).19 Again, he 
sees the difference as temporal: at least one reason why 
"what is so" lacks complementarity is that descriptive 
relations have only the temporary fixity of "stopping." 
In relation to objects, when a name does not "fit" (dang 
m), it "errs" (guo X). Guo implies "to pass beyond," 
which can be taken as either "to miss" or "to exceed." 
Graham explains guo as a technical term, and most of the 
examples he cites are related to knowledge persisting 
after the experience of the object is in the past. Although 
guo can be taken spatially (and Graham admits that there 
are "a few cases of passing in space"), Graham chooses 
to interpret it primarily in the temporal sense of "having 
passed."20 He accounts for the use of guo in unfamiliar 
contexts in terms of the Mohist's "special concern with 
the problem of transient conditions of knowledge." Thus, 
he contends that the complementarity of shifei permits 
necessary knowledge, but owing to its transience the non- 
complementarity of ran cannot do the same. 
At the most basic level, this argument about dividing 
the text in terms of the eternal (shifei) and the transient 
(ran, zhi, and guo) might at least derive from the occur- 
rence of numerous references to zhi _L and ran J in the 
section on names and objects (section A 88-B 12). But, 
of the eighteen occurrences of zhi iL in the text (five of 
which are emendations), eleven fall outside the section 
19 Graham explains that the necessity of causal change in 
objects resembles the necessary relations among names. He 
describes the unified world-picture of the four disciplines as "a 
cosmos of concrete and particular objects . . . located in space 
and changing through time, interconnected by necessary rela- 
tions like the logical relations between their names" (emphasis 
added). 
Graham describes a gu C--a reason in the sciences-as a 
"complement that is either a necessary or a sufficient condition." 
"When in justifying descriptions or in the sciences we offer a 
'reason' (gu i), we are offering one of complements .. ." (ibid., 
38). "In the sciences a ku is a cause, for example a wound or 
dampness as the cause of illness; a wound is 'why the thing is 
so"' (B 9 2I f:JtJ,,); "dampness is a cause: it is necessarily 
required that what it does comes about" (A 77). [Canon A 77 
says nothing about illness.] Graham then uses this understand- 
ing of gu iM-necessity in the sciences-to buttress the struc- 
ture he sees in the Canons: "The necessity of causal relations 
accounts for the placing of the sequences on the sciences with 
those on disputation after the bridging sequences on knowledge 
and change, the definitions of which end with bi 'necessary'." 
Later Mohist Logic, 54. 
20 Ibid., 190-91. 
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in question-appearing in the names section, the ob- 
jects section, and in the appendix on "ambiguous words." 
Moreover, in A 88-B 12 (the description section, which 
is purportedly about "what is so") there are clear uses of 
shifei JH, and many more uses of shi i than there are 
of ran ,. 
Of course, the context of these occurrences is as im- 
portant as their frequency. In one of the most prominent 
occurrences of shifei in the description section (A 88), 
Graham takes the Canon to be a discussion of the differ- 
ence between the "absolute" and the "relative"; hence, 
perhaps, a discussion of the difference between logic and 
description. As things that are "absolute," A 88 lists 
heibai (,'l) "black and white," guijian ($,) "dear 
and cheap," as well as shifei (il) "being this or not 
being it" [Graham's translation], and cunwang (ft) 
"present or absent."21 Graham manages to interpret these 
pairs of opposites as contrasting with a set of "relative" 
terms that includesjianrou (Qi) "hard and soft" sisheng 
(ITEL) "dead and alive," qujiu (-,A) "departing and 
approaching," and youwu (14Mi) "having and lacking."22 
Presumably, there is some difference between "dear 
and cheap" and "hard and soft" that makes the former 
pair "absolute" while the latter is "relative," hence about 
"what is so." We are referred to the text of B 30 and 
B 31, which seems to say that the price of commodities 
is fixed by supply and demand. B 30 says: "If the royal 
coin does not alter but the supply of grain does alter, 
when the harvest alters the supply of grain it alters the 
coin." B 31 says: "Whether the price is right or not de- 
cides whether the people want to or not. (For example, 
people in a defeated state selling their houses and mar- 
rying off their daughters.)" Somehow, instead of seeing 
these Canons as reflecting the relative value of coins and 
daughters, Graham discovers here that an exact price must 
mean only two alternatives (dear or cheap), and this is 
supposed to explain why "dear and cheap" is absolute. 
He writes: "If .. . we have only two alternatives, then one 
either is X or is not X . . . Commodities, since there is an 
exact and proper price fixed by supply and demand (B 30, 
31), are either dear or cheap." 
Graham adduces examples (often highly emended) in 
the "Explanation" to justify these categorizations. For 
21 "Absolute" is Graham's reading of jue sheng giMj, liter- 
ally, "to prevail decisively." He takes jue as "breaking off from 
the other" and sheng in the sense of "win in disputation." Ibid., 
339-40. 
22 In contrast to jue sheng-taking jiao < as 'interplay' and 
fang }~ as 'depend on, be relative to'-Graham translates jiao 
de fang SZj;tj as "relative." Ibid., 338-39. 
instance, to explain why "having and lacking" is "rela- 
tive," he appeals to the "explanation"-- ?*, X*N, f 
Md-2.23 (Graham takes fu g to be the same asfu i that 
appears elsewhere in Mozi meaning "wealthy." Zhi ̀ ? is 
written with a heart signific, and emended from nu ~; 
Graham associates it with the "native intelligence" re- 
ferred to in Mencius 7 A115.) Now, in spite of the fact 
that he has just classified being dear or cheap as "abso- 
lute," Graham concludes from this line that "having (there 
being) a rich family or an excellent native intelligence is 
no less relative than being rich." He fares little better in 
explaining "dead and alive" as a relative pair of items: 
ILJ [7t] *;*43, Lt. 
In the case of a sword just striking (?), 'dead and alive'. 
Although two of the three characters in this explana- 
tory phrase are emended, Graham manages to draw this 
conclusion, 
The example of this pair is unfortunately corrupt, but if 
we have emended it correctly it refers to the moment 
when life ends and death begins (cf. A 50) and should 
be read in light of Hui Shi's sophism 'The sun is simul- 
taneously at noon and declining, a thing is simulta- 
neously alive and dead.' (Zhuangzi ch. 33 (Guo 1102/3) 
HE T[ jBJ HM, ~1 tX - yr T,). 24 
Even if it is appropriate to emend so radically, it is 
difficult to see why these very extended senses of each 
term "provided by the examples" would suffice to justify 
rigid classification into opposing categories. 
Graham posits a distinction between shi H and ci It 
that also plays a significant role in his structuring of the 
Canons. He believes ci refers to particulars-things that 
are outside the purview of logic-and he claims that the 
Canons are quite strict in their usage of shi and ci, such 
that shi only means "the thing in question" whereas ci 
means "the instance here." Thus, because Graham presup- 
poses that logic does not deal with particulars, he care- 
fully translates instances of shi that appear in the section 
on names as "this thing in question" or "this thing as it 
23 The asterisk indicates a character Graham has emended. 
24 Graham explains thatfang ~ has been substituted for you 
7L, because zhong 4r has been substituted for zao F. Zhong 
has been substituted "on grounds of systematic corruption" and 
because you appears nowhere else in the Canons. It is worth 
noting that the reference to "the will of Heaven" also occurs 
only once, but Graham does not emend it on those grounds. 
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is judged to be." However, in the section on description, 
in one instance of shi (variously rendered elsewhere by 
Graham as "what it is," "of these," "a thing that it is," 
and "what we called it"), Graham translates shi as "this." 
His translation of - ItHI , 1tJJ-- ] ; X reads: 
"If 'beautiful' is said of this, then inherently it is this that 
is beautiful; if it is said of another, it is not the case that 
this is beautiful ...."25 Thus, even Graham cannot force 
the Canons to conform to a hypothetically rigorous dis- 
tinction between shi and ci, a distinction that appears to 
have no basis outside of the Canons. Graham admits that 
Names and objects, a later text-which he claims is so 
analytically careful as to have distinguished the form of 
the sentence for the first time-does not follow the Can- 
ons in this strict treatment of shi and ci. He contends that 
it is because Names and objects uses the term mou X = 
"X" (although it does so only in one line) that shi and 
ci are no longer carefully distinguished. This leaves him 
free to alter the translation of shi in any occurrence in 
Names and objects to suit his own interpretation. 
The distinction Graham proposes between shi as "this 
thing in question" and ci as "the instance here" seems to 
imply that logic can only include objects in the form of 
"the thing in question." Indeed, Graham's description of 
logic as "names only" suggests as much. His contrast 
between the Mohist's dispute over "converses" and the 
Western view of logical "contradictories" also makes this 
point, although indirectly. Graham says the difference is 
that in a "converse" (fan) one side may say something 
like "it is a dog" and the other must say "it is not a dog." 
Thus, "The point aboutfan is that if one kind of thing is 
an ox we can 'reverse' and say that all others are non- 
oxen, as contradictories only one is true, asfan both are 
true."26 But there seems to be more to Graham's charac- 
terization of Mohist disputation than just that it is true 
on both sides. There is also some suggestion that Mohist 
logical converses differ from Western contradictories in 
that converses do not involve particular objects. Graham 
says: "Disputation is defined as 'contending over converse 
claims' (A 74), not, as a Westerner would have been 
inclined to expect, contending over contradictory state- 
ments about the same things."27 Graham explains that for 
the Mohist, "in disputation we are not, for example, de- 
ciding whether to say of a certain man who loves some 
men that 'He loves men', but judging some such ques- 
tion as whether or not the love of some men is the love 
of men."28 
25 Graham reads ye -12 as ta fI here. 
26 Later Mohist Logic, 169. 
27 Ibid., 39, emphasis added. 
28 Ibid., 38. 
However, in spite of this apparent contrast between 
"claims" and "things" (or "questions" and "a certain 
man"), the point ultimately does not seem to be that the 
difference between the Mohist's converses and the West- 
erner's contradictories is that the Mohist's converses 
are not "about the same things."29 In fact, according to 
Graham's translation of dang 2 as "fit the fact," when 
the Canon says one side wins in disputation, it fits one 
particular fact-that is, in Graham's other terms, the 
"name" fits the "object." Thus, when Graham says "one 
man says it is this and the other that it is not," this "it" 
is a "same thing"-a fact/object to be fit-and in this 
sense the "names only" section also seems to be about 
relating names to objects. Indeed, Graham insists that the 
"it" about which claims of disputation contend is not the 
object as described (language) but the actual object ("in 
front of the eyes"), 
A crucial question is whether the thing proved in dispu- 
tation to be necessarily an ox is conceived to be the thing 
as described or the actual object in front of our eyes. 
There can be little doubt that the latter is the right 
answer.30 
Thus, having distinguished the necessary disciplines of 
"names" and "objects" from the merely consistent disci- 
pline of "relating names and objects," Graham begins to 
rejoin them-pointing to ways in which the "names" 
section is about relating to objects after all. (But if logic 
also relates names to objects, then what is the point in 
his calling one "names" and the other "names and ob- 
jects," thereby strictly separating the two disciplines?) 
Graham asks: 
How far does he [the Mohist] go in divorcing the realms 
of fact and logic? He regards the logically inadmissible 
as necessarily mistaken in fact (B 71 "If what this man 
says is inadmissible, to suppose that it fits the fact is 
necessarily ill-considered"), and uses disputation to show 
that a claim does not fit the fact (B 35, 40) although not 
that it does. Of one name, 'thing', it is said that "any 
object necessarily requires this name" (A 78).31 
Names are knowable because they have logical necessity 
(bi E,); objects are knowable because they have causal 
necessity (gu [1). And, assuming that by "facts" Graham 
29 Actually, the Canon Graham refers to for his definition of 
disputation as "contending over converse claims" is not explic- 
itly about claims. 
30 Later Mohist Logic, 39. 
31 Ibid. 
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means the realm of names and objects, the relation of 
names and objects is knowable because in some ways (as 
in the above quote) these necessities overlap. 
This overlap between the disciplines seems to account 
for Graham's contention that all Mohist knowledge is 
"necessary": 
The Mohist raises no epistemological questions, he has 
no doubts that whether by observation, report or expla- 
nation we can know, and that when we do 'we necessar- 
ily do know' (A 3). Presumably the relation between the 
animal I see and my knowledge of it is necessary in the 
sense that if it is not really there I do not know, merely 
suppose (yi wei J21, cf. A 24).32 
The kinds of knowledge Graham mentions here in the 
context of not raising epistemological questions (obser- 
vation, explanation, and report) include both the nec- 
essary and the merely consistent disciplines.33 Knowing 
by observation that a particular animal is an ox seems to 
belong either to description or to science. Knowing by 
explanation that it fits the standard for ox belongs to 
logic. Graham does not expound on how one can know 
that it is an ox by report, but a report does not suggest 
either science or logic. If knowledge is necessary even 
within the merely consistent discipline of names and 
objects, postulating a distinction between the disciplines 
seems unwarranted. 
Another way that Graham tries to fill the gap he posits 
between the certainty of "names" and the temporary 
validity of "relating names and objects" is through the 
notion that an object can engender a name, which, when 
compared to a standard, takes on the necessity of com- 
plementary relations (like that of shifei). Graham finds 
evidence for this in two "obscure and corrupt passages." 
32 If the Explanation of A 3 is meant to assert that "when we 
know we necessarily do know," it certainly produces the asser- 
tion in an odd way. A 3 reads: 
M, t_t. [3]. b [?] : i:2tiMf[.l Mm]. 
Graham takes this to say, "The 'intelligence': it being 
the means by which one knows, one necessarily does 
know. (Like the eyesight.)" This forces him to translate 
zhi Mn once as "intelligence" and once as "knowing" in 
the same sentence. 
A 24 is merely an instance of the expression yi wei JgA 
,. It says, ;, Jk ij,,3 J -A2. Graham's translation reads, 
"Meng (dreaming) is supposing to be so while sleeping." 
33 Graham gets this list from A 82. 
From these difficult passages, he speculates that deeming 
something "X" involves a kind of "complement." (In 
this case, the "complement" is being "similar to the stan- 
dard.") Like the complementary converse claims of dis- 
putation, these complementary relations are necessary.34 
According to Graham, one can infer this from passages 
A 39 and A 85: 
... the Mohist conceived being deemed (wei )) an X 
as the complement of being similar to the standard; the 
deeming is 'engendered' (sheng t) by the object as we 
perceive it, but becomes necessary only when 'matured' 
(shu ?A = A4) by comparison with the standard. The word 
'necessary' is 'said of cases where a complement is 
matured'. (A 51 XI* 5Att_).35 
Moreover, by changing his terminology from "objects" to 
"facts," Graham adds certainty to the consistent proce- 
dures of description. Although he insists that the disci- 
pline still only aspires to consistency, in the Names and 
objects section the relation between names and objects 
becomes a relation between propositions and "facts."36 
The argument that seeks to establish a connection be- 
tween "root" and "fact" is quite complex. 
Canon A 86 lists four types of sameness. Graham 
identifies these "samenesses" with what is mentioned in 
34 Later Mohist Logic, 38. 
35 In Graham's text and the original di has no "mouth" radical. 
Graham takes the reference to "complement" in A 39 to mean 
the name "pillar" that is applied to the perceived object. Yet, it 
is not clear that even his greatly emended version of A 39 is 
concerned with "the object as we perceive it." Significantly, 
Graham does not attempt to explain what the example of serv- 
ing a ruler has to do with objects of perception. 
Moreover, A 85 may not be about "complement" either. The 
term "complement" is a part of a double emendation that is 
somehow related to "keep as it is," but even after the emen- 
dation the meaning of the phrase remains cryptic. Both zhong 
and di (the only reference to "complement" in this Canon) are 
emended from 'early' and 6 'lookout, tower'. 
In A 51 as well, di is an emendation-again for tai. Graham 
reads #A as shu A 'ripe, cooked', although he notes most editors 
have followed Bi Yuan in emending to zhi U 'hold'. In the last 
line, Graham emends from bi , to zhi _t because he finds bi 
"unintelligible in this context." 
36 Later Mohist Logic, 40. "Fact," is Graham's translation of 
gu ;t. The use of this word may simply be Graham's attempt 
to indicate what corresponds to propositions in the way that 
objects correspond to names, but its effect is to lend an air of 
certainty to the discipline. 
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Names and objects (NO 6) as "sameness with the same 
name."37 The "sameness with the same name" appears in 
NO 6 along with the "mysteriously" named "sameness of 
the same root"- ];ti_ [ll which are also four: fl X, ,f 
M, [M-I, and Mm[-]). Graham calls these "sameness 
in being separated off," "sameness of the accessory," 
"sameness in being this," and "sameness in being so." 
The first and second of these "sameness of the same 
root" are irrelevant to the connection Graham wants to 
make between root and fact. He remarks that they are not 
as important as the other two,38 and identifies "sameness 
in being set off" _i_ as "sameness in not being this or 
so." "Sameness of the accessory" ,ftMl is more difficult 
for Graham to explain. To establish the meaning of fu 
,,t, he speculates in what follows about the significance 
of the color of horses, although the color of horses is not 
even mentioned: 
the only point of similarity and difference in Nos. 1-6 
which is not a matter of being this or so is the difference 
between 'white horse' and 'black horse'. In "The horse is 
white" and "The stone is white" horse and stone would 
be the same in that being white is so of both of them; 
and the sameness would remain if we cut off the root of 
the sentences and attached it to horse and stone to make 
'white horse' and 'white stone'. We may guess that this 
was the significance of fu t'ung.39 
37 Actually, A 82 lists H, A., _, and V; so only two of them 
are the same. Graham takes ti I as lian 4 (with some basis, 
since they are connected in A 82), and he i as ju _, defining 
he as "sameness of properties such as hardness and whiteness 
composing one stone." 
38 Graham considers "sameness in being this" and "same- 
ness in being so" to be important because they are "the only 
ones for which he [the Mohist] mentions corresponding types 
of difference," as if it were not possible that they might simply 
be the only kinds of "samenesses" whose corresponding types 
of differences survived. 
39 The text of Nos. 1-6 is particularly corrupt, consisting of 
rearranged fragments from "The Greater Pick" and "The Lesser 
Pick." (These are the names of the last two dialectical chap- 
ters from which Expounding the canons and Names and objects 
are reconstructed. "The Greater Pick" is a collection of frag- 
ments; "The Lesser Pick" is quite a bit more intelligible.) Thus, 
there is no reason to assume that Nos. 1-6 as reconstructed by 
Graham exhaust the set of options for ways of naming, as he 
himself acknowledges. Given the corruption of the text, it seems 
particularly difficult o argue for a definition of one character in 
NO 6 by correlating items that do appear in the preceding frag- 
ments as if these were the only possible items to be correlated. 
The word for "root," gen ft, does not appear any- 
where else in the Canons or in Names and objects. To 
define it, Graham focuses on "sameness in being this" 
(i[Hi ]) and "sameness in being so" (, 1i ). Without 
further explanation it is asserted that "we may identify 
them in the light of the examples of 'being so if the one 
instanced is this' (T7il?) in NO 4 and NO 13." But 
NO 4 does not establish any connection between gen and 
"this" or "so." It merely says: 
--E7Ti , T _MM,,f, _- ffn t, E , E ... 
Of one, says [One says?] "if this then so." Of two, say 
"if this then not so." Of three, say "it shifts." Of four, 
say... [my translation].40 
And NO 13 merely says: 
~Tr:75mI, s irpIf TPM, <;VTMffi>, -*, 
m--3*W, A-* M -[f ] [.. .] 4rt.41 
Of the thing in general, there are cases where (1) some- 
thing is so if the instanced is this thing, or (2) is not so 
though the instanced is this thing, or (3) is so though the 
instanced is not this thing, or (4) applies without excep- 
tion in one case but not in the other, or (5) the instanced 
in one case is this and in the other is not. 
Thus, NO 4 and NO 13 do not provide much of a clue 
to the meaning of "sameness of the same root." Yet 
Graham proceeds to argue that identifying the "this" 
and "so" of the "sameness of having the same root" with 
NO 4 and NO 13 means identifying them with the vari- 
ous phrases in Names and objects that he has already de- 
termined to be about "this" and "so." Thus, he comes up 
with a list from NO 1, NO 11, and NO 14 of examples 
of what he regards as cases of "being this" and "being 
so." "A white horse is a horse," for instance, he holds to 
be an example of "being this," whereas "ride a white 
horse" he takes as an example of "being so." That is, 
any nominal sentence is a case of "being this" and any 
verbal or adjectival sentence is a case of "being so." He 
40 Graham's translation reads: "In the first case we say that if 
the instanced is this ['the stone'] something is so of it ['white'], 
in the second that though the instanced is this something is not 
so of it ['big'], in the third it has changed in place ['Ch'in 
horse'], in the fourth that it..." 
41 Both of these cases of J, "apply without exception" are 
emendations from - "harm, obstruct," which Graham lists as 
being corrupt in this case. 
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then declares: "The root of the sentence then is the com- 
plement of the nominal or the main verb of the verbal 
sentence. We find this hypothesis further supported when 
we come to the description of the proposition in NO 10." 
In discussing NO 10, Graham equates "sameness with 
the same root" with the object.42 Graham's discussion of 
NO 10 is meant to buttress his claim that, according to 
the theory of description in the Canons, after applying 
one name to one object, one then "proceeds" (fj) to 
similar objects. This "theory of description in Canons" 
appears to refer only to B 1, where the reference to "pro- 
ceeding" is, however, actually not about objects. B 1 
reads: 
f;R2A. rj M. 
[1]. ~Jlt,~,tA~,~. mJXt:, ,~ ~~ 
, t . 
Graham translates: 
c. Fix the kind, in order to 'make the man proceed'. 
Explained by: the sameness. 
E. The other, on the grounds that it is so of the instance 
here, argues that it is so of the thing it is; I, on the 
grounds that it is not so of the instance here, doubt 
that it is so of the thing it is. 
B 1 contains the only use of "proceeds" that Graham 
refers to when he discusses "proceeding" in NO 10. He 
notes, "Names and objects has now arrived at the point 
which the corresponding series of Canons reached at B 1; 
having 'separated the roads' (A 97) we 'make the man 
proceed' (B 1), from what is so of particulars to what 
is so of the kind."43 Graham states that in NO 10 what 
proceeds now is not a name (though before it was "the 
man"), but rather a proposition. Moreover, he surmises, 
Names and objects must be talking about the "root" 
(although the term is not used) when it says of the 
"proposition": 
NO 10 fi TC 5B/2-6 W Pi-, WJ3: , Jt2*AxT_. 
The proposition is something which is engendered in 
accordance with a fact, becoming full grown according 
to a pattern, and 'proceeds' according to the kind. 
42 In another context, Graham identifies the relation of prop- 
erties in an object as a form of sameness with the same name- 
he i. See Canon A 74. 
43 Emphasis added. 
The condition of the text here is significant: it consists 
of two pieces. Graham has added the topic "the propo- 
sition." Yet he reads this as the proposition being broken 
into two parts.44 One part is engendered "in accordance 
with the gu Mi." The other completes it "according to 
the li 3m." 
From here on Graham presents no real argument. 
Instead he makes a series of connections. 
Then the first part engendered is precisely the part called 
the root (gen ft) in NO 6, the complement of a nominal 
sentence or a main verb of a verbal sentence.... Return- 
ing to the first of the six sentences we analysed under 
NO 6, the root will be ,"_ "It is a horse," which is 
judged true or false by comparison with the gu, the horse 
itself. This connects with the phrase in A 39 f9tl_*9i 
"The pillar's engendering of the ti ('complement', not of 
course in the grammatical sense)," where we took the ti 
to be the name 'pillar' applied to the object. 
Thus, through this series of tenuous connections Graham 
maintains that the mysterious "root" (of "sameness of 
the same root") is the part of a proposition that is en- 
gendered by facts. With facts engendering the proposi- 
tions of names and objects, description becomes that 
much more certain in its procedures-again reducing the 
gap Graham posits between the eternally necessary realms 
and the merely consistent transient realms. By introducing 
these various bridges between realms, Graham unwit- 
tingly seems to undermine his argument that the Mohists 
separated them in the first place. 
Overall, Graham's reconstruction may be questioned 
both in terms of structure and content. Structurally, 
Graham is well aware of "the extent to which the under- 
standing of classical Chinese depends on context." If we 
cannot explain the order of the Canons, we have little 
solid basis for interpreting them. As Graham puts it, if 
the order of the Canons is random, then 
... our inquiries into the textual history, grammar, tech- 
nical terminology, and stock illustrations would still not 
altogether dispel the suspicion that the study of the 
Canons involves too many imponderables for confident 
interpretation. In Chinese even more than in other lan- 
guages, a passage without context in a document recog- 
nized to be corrupt gives too much scope for imaginative 
interpretation.45 
44 That is, he does not read it as two things that are true to the 
proposition, if indeed the fragment is about the proposition. 
45 Later Mohist Logic, 229. 
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In other words, Graham's translation and interpretation 
rely on the way he divides the Canons into themes. There 
is an element of circularity in the whole procedure as 
Graham himself seems to admit. To the extent that we 
doubt the themes he has assigned to the various sections 
into which he breaks the Canons, we may doubt his 
determination regarding the content of the Canons. Of 
course the intelligibility of the final product provides 
some evidence in favor of Graham's restructuring of the 
Canons. However, this intelligibility seems inextricably 
linked to Graham's identification of the theme of each 
section and, more importantly, to his questionable theory 
regarding the temporal nature of each section. Graham's 
argument for the distinction between transient and eter- 
nal sides of the Canons is both incongruous with the 
world-view of ancient China and is founded upon tenu- 
ous connections in emended texts. Although he presents 
this as a gap between "names," "objects," and "names 
and objects," that distinction on close examination does 
not hold, leaving little ground for believing his explana- 
tion of the order of the Canons. Graham's reconstruction 
of the Canons may, in the end, be a case where proceed- 
ing from a faulty hypothesis leads to more confusion 
than not proceeding at all.46 
46 This is especially true when that hypothesis is then applied 
to other texts that are not as indecipherable, which Graham 
does by using his order of the Canons to interpret the "Rectifi- 
cation of Names" chapter of the Xunzi. 
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